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WHEN ARE DEEDS TESTAMENTARY?'
T is.no objection to a deed that it is used as a substitute for a
will, to avoid the expense and delay of probate proceedings. 2 The
frequent litigation arising over such deeds, however, shows that
this expedient is a* dangerous one unless the grantor uses great care
to avoid certain snares and pitfalls which the law in its wisdom
provides for the unwary. The grantor may attempt to accomplish
his purpose either by express provisions embodied in the deed itself,
or by external, collateral conditions, preserved by the delivery of
the deed to a deposifory. This paper will consider how far the
transfer of the title may be suspended by (I)' internal, and (2) by ex-
ternal conditions precedent; and particularly how far extrinsic
evidence of conditional delivery will be allowed to determine the
estates which the instrument shall create and the contingencies upon
which it shall become fully operative.
There is a sharp conflict of authority between different states
as to the effect of provisions in a deed that "no title or interest
shall pass to the grantee until the grantor's death." Such provisions
by which no estate is created at the time of delivery would appar-
ently make the instrument testamentary, "because a deed not to
take effect until after the death of the grantor amounts to a testa-
mentary disposition of the property without complying with the
Statute of Wills." 3 In some states such language is given literal ef-
fect and the deed is held void as an attempted will.4 If the instru-
ment is to have no legal operation as a completed legal act until the
death of the maker, then it is everywhere a will.5 But in a majority
of states the language that the deed is "to be in force or take effect
from and after the decease of the grantor," is interpreted very liber-
ally. Such language may be regarded as representing a confusion
of two intents: (I) an intent to give an estate to commence in
futuro, but to reserve the possession, use and enjoyment of the
property during the grantor's life; and (2) an intent not to make a
1 By Henry W. Ballantine, Dean, College of Law, University of Illinois.
2 Young v..Payne, 283 Ill. 649, 119 N. E. 612.
3 Wilson v. Wilson, 158 Ill. 567; NofftZ v. NofftZ, 29O Ill. 36, 43; Jo;nson v. Fulk,
282 IIl. 328; Babb v. Harrison, (S. C.) 9 Rich. Eq. III; 7o Am. Dec. 294; Cole v.
Nickel, (Nev., i9g9) 177 Pac. 409; Ferris v. Neville, 127 Mich. 444, 89 A. S. R. 495.
' Turner v. Scott, 5i Pa. St. 126; Boon v. Castle, iz5 N. Y. Supp. 583; Ransom v.
Pottawattamie Co., 168 Ia. 570, i.so N. W. 657; Moody v. Macomber, (ipro) 159 Mich.
657, 124 N. W. 549; Goodale v. Evans (1914) 263 Mo. 219; 8 R. C. L., Sec. ir, p. 933,
n. 20.
3 Cline v. Jones, xxx Ill. 563; Pemberton v. Kraper, 289 Ill. 295. See note on "Deeds
to Take Effect upon Death of Grantor," 17 Micir. L. REV. p. 413; 3 CAL. L. Rrv. p. 256;
Niccolls v. Niccolls (grg4) r68 Cal. 444, 243 Pac. 712; Meeker v. Spencer (Cal. App.)
r82 Pac. 782.
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present dispositive instrument, but to keep the deed ambulatory like
a will during the grantor's lifetime. The probable intention is ef-
fectuated by holding the instrument operative in praeienti as a
grant of future estate. 6 Thus in Shackelton v. SebreeT a provision
"this deed not to take effect until after my decease, not to be rec-
orded until after my decease," was sustained as a present grant of a
future estate. Similar holdings have been made in many other cases.8
In view of the act of delivery to the grantee in the lifetime of the
grantor, and the intention to be gathered from the whole transaction,
the provision that "title shall not pass until death," does not mean
that the grantee shall acquire no right or interest under the deed
until the grantor's death. The deed conveys a vested interest to
commence in futuro, and necessarily cuts down the estate remaining
in the grantor.'
A grantor may thus make a present conveyance in fee, express-
ly reserving to himself, or to himself and his wife, a life estate. If
a conveyance is conditioned not to take effect until the grantor's
death, is the grantor left with a fee subject to a springing fee in the
grantee, or is his fee impliedly cut down at once to a life estate,
with a remainder in fee in the grantee? Upon the answer to this
question may depend the liability of the grantor for waste, and the
right of his widow to dower if he made such a deed before his mar-
riage." Mr. Kales contends that "it would seem best to sustain
gifts after the grantor's death, when no life estate is expressly re-
served as a springing interest cutting short a resulting estate in fee
in the grantor."' 0
A conveyance by A to B from Christmas next, or to B on the
death of A is an attempt to create an estate of freehold to commence
0Blanchard v. Morey, (1883) 56 Vt. 17O; Shaull v. Shtull (Iowa) x6o N. W. 36;
z66 N. W. 301; Nolan v. Otney, 75 Kan. 311, 89 Pac. 69o, 9 L. R. A. (N.S.) J-7; 8 R.
C. L., Sec. is, n. _z.
186 IIl. 6z6.
sLatimr v. Latimer, 174 Ill., 418, Sr N. E. 548, "To be in force from and after my
decease and not before." White v. Willard, 232 Itl. 464, "Title shall become absolute only
on death of grantors." Bowler v. Bowler, 176 Ill. 541, "Not to be of any force and effect
until after the death of the grantor." See also: O'Brien v. O'Brien, 28s Ill. 57o, 575;
Craig v. Rgpcke, 274 Il1. 626; Hudson v. Hudson, 287 Ill. 286, 296; Bradley v. Bradley,
(Iowa) rXr N. W. 729; Shaull v. Shaull, (Iowa) 166 N. W. 301, 30 HAzv. L. REV. SoS.
9 Wilson v. Carrico, 140 Ind. 533, 4o N. E. 5o, 49 Am. St. Rep. 213; Nowakowski v.
Sobeziak, 270 I1. 622, 624; Linn v. Campbell, 289 Ill. 347, 352; Bowler v. Bowler, 176
IlL 541.
91 Bullard v, Suedmeler, 29t Ill. 400, "Estate impliedly reserved for his own life and
that of his wife, not an estate of inheritance, although wife survives, and so wife had no
dower therein." Stewart v. Wood, 48 II. App. 378.
"0KALEs, FUTURE INTERESTS, Sec. s58b., Sec. i59; Vinson v. Vinson, (1870) 4 Ill.
App. 138, x42; Abbott v. Holway, 72 Me. 298; HuDsoN, EXECUTORY LIMITATioNs, Mo.
DULL. xx Law Series, p. 3, 26; FEaRNE, CONT. REM., p. i, Butler's note.
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in futuro, and would at common law be absolutely null. It is now
well established, however, that an executory interest does not need
any freehold to support it. If the future use is contingent and is to
commence upon an uncertain event such as the marriage of B, then
the disposition might well be regarded as leaving the fee in the
grantor, rather than a life estate followed by a destructible conting-
ent remainder. The use cannot arise until the future event, and in
the meantime the grantor necessarily retains his original estate
subject to an executory interest or springing use.1 When on the
other hand the limitations are to take effect upon a certain event,
then the law may mould the estate remaining in the grantor into an
estate for life or for years, as the case may be. Thus where a deed
provided that after the expiration of fifteen years the title to a
certain court yard should vest in the party of the second part and
his heirs without any further conveyance, it was held operative as
a present conveyance of the fee subject to an estate for years, and
not as an estate to commence in futuro.'2 So deeds limited to take
effect at death have the practical effect of creating a life estate in
the grantor and a vested remainder in the grantee.
It was held by Hale, C. J., and two judges in the case of Pybus
v. Mitford,'3 where the grantor, A covenanted to stand seized to
the use of the heirs male of his body by a second marriage, that
although the use did not arise until his death his land was bound by it
immediately. It was a future springing use, without any particular
estate expressly limited to support it. The estate undisposed of
during his life continued in the grantor during the meantime as an
estate for life by implication or subtraction.
If a man covenants to stand seized to the use of his sons from
and after his marriage, this is purely a contingent use, because the
possible marriage may never take place and nothing is "fetched"
out of the covenantor. So much of the use as the covenantor does
not dispose of otherwise remains in him. But if A covenants to
stand seized to the use of J. S. after 40 years, it may be considered
either as a fee simple conditional in the covenantor or as reduced
to an estate for years, a new estate created by implication of law.
Where the limitations are to take effect at the death of the grantor
or covenantor, there the law may well mould the estate remaining in
the covenantor into an estate for life.
This is not a case of resulting use by operation of law, as Mr.
Kales seems to suppose, but of moulding the estate by the necessary
"LEAxE, LAND LAW [2nd ed] p. 88, 107, 253, 254, 350.
'
2Eckhart v. Irons, 128 I. 568, 58o.
2(K. B. 1668), 2 Lev. 75, 1 Vent. 372, 83 EngI. Reprint 456.
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cutting down of his interest by subtraction. By the delivery of his
deed to B, A intends to make a present disposition and vest in B
a right which will spring up at his death. By the provision that the
deed is to take effect at death, he intends to keep the full use of. the
land during his life, with all the rights of ownership except the
power of disposition. His fee then becomes subject to a vested con-
ditional limitation, which is substantially a remainder after a life
estate. This life estate might well be held to be impliedly reserved
without impeachnent of waste since it is moulded by the law. The
grantor evidently intends to retain all the dominion and ownership
over the land during his life (such as mining rights), consistent
with an unconditional grant in fee to commence in possession and en-
joyment at his death.14
In many cases the grantor makes an implied or express reserva-
tion of a life estate by a clause in the deed itself and such a deed may
be delivered direct to the grantee.15 The same result substantially
may be accomplished by a deed drawn in the absolute form and de-
livered to a third person, to be handed to the grantee after the death
of the-grantor. It may be asked, How can a life estate in the
grantor be created by a juggling of delivery?"e It has been said that
"the function of delivery is to determine whether the instrument
shall be operative, not the estate or estates which the instrument
shall create when it does become operative."'" "A deed of convey-
ance in present terms is inconsistent with the retention of a life
estate."'18 Nevertheless, by the unconditional delivery of an abso-
lute deed to a third person to be handed to the grantee on the
grantor's death the grantor may impliedly reserve a life estate just
as he does by an express provision in the deed suspending its oper-
ation until his death. The deed will in many states operate as a
present conveyance of the fee and title passes immediately, sub-
ject to a life estate which is by implication left in the grantor. 9
14 Jones v. Caird, 153 Wis. 384.
2 Harshbarger v. Carroll, 163 I1. 636; White v. Willard, 232 I1. 464.
" R. W. AIGLER, "Is a Contract Necessary to an Escrow?" 16 Micu. L. REv. 569,586---"How a life estate in the grantor can be created by a juggling of delivery is a
question never adequately answered."
"T TIFFANY, "Conditional Delivery of Deeds," 10 COL. L. REv. 404.
28Taft v. Taft, 59 Mich. x85, 26 N. W. 426.1
1 Arnegaard v. Arnegaard, 7 N. D. 475, 75 N. W. 797; Hathaway v. Cook, 258 Ill.92; Grilley v. Atkins, 78 Conn. 38o, 62 At. 337. 4 L. R. A. (N.S.) 816 n.; Bury v.Young, (r893) 98 Cal. 446, 33 Pac. 338; Wittenbrock v. Cass, (1895) 55o Cal. 1, 42Pac. 300; Tennant v. John Tennant, 167 Cal. 570, 140 Pac. 242; Thatcher v. St. Andrews.
37 Mich. 264; Meech v. Wilder, 130 Mich. 29. See BIGELOW, "CoNDxIONAL DELIVERY,"26 HARV. L. REV. 576, 579; Fulton v. Priddy, 123 Mich. 298, 82 N. W. 665; Bishop v.
Dodge, x96 Mich. 231, 162 N. W. 1002.
MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
In Smith v. Smith" deeds were deposited with an attorney of the
grantor with written directions for the depositary to deliver them
"upon my death, so that they may then take effect." It was held that
this did not prevent the present passing of title at the time of de-
positing the deeds, if on all the evidence the directions referred to
the time of enjoyment rather than to the passing of title.21
In some states, however, the deposit of a deed with a third
person, absolute in form, to be delivered at grantor's death, does
not operate as a present conveyance to vest at once a future estate
in the grantee or reduce the grantor's fee to a life estate, but will
be good as an "escrow" to pass the title at the grantor's death. In
Illinois perhaps the leading case on the delivery of an absolute deed
to a third person, to take effect at the death of the grantor, is
Stone v. Duval.2 In that case a deed by Duvall to his daughter
was acknowledged before a justice of the peace, who was directed
by the grantor to have it recorded and to hold it until the death of
the grantor and then deliver it to the grantee. Subsequently
the grantee died. Suit was brought for the purpose of having the
deed which Duvall had executed to his daughter set aside. The
court held that there had been a good delivery as an escrow, and
said: "But in sufh case the delivery only relates back so as to carry
out the intention of the grantor and to vest the title. * * * So in
this case the deed is an escrow, that will not take effect until Du-
vall's death, when it may be delivered to the heirs of the grantee,
and it will be held to have taken effect so as to have vested such a
title in the mother as to pass the fee to them. Until that time
Duvall will be entitled to the use of the property as though he had
a life estate, and the children of Mrs. Stone the remainder." This
language was used with reference to a straight deed of conveyance,
without the express reservation of any life estate. The language
used by the court is quoted in a number of subsequent cases.23 The
idea seems to be that, though the delivery is not absolute so as to
vest an immediate estate in the land, yet it will be good to pass title
at the grantor's death to the grantee and his heirs. In effect, then,
"Smith v. Smith, 173 Cal. 725, x6T Pac. 495; Whitney v. Sherman, (Cal., 1918)
:73 Pac. 931.
"See also: Hunt v. Wicht, (Cal.) x6z Pac. 639, L. R. A. 19I7-C 961; West v.
Wright, xix5 Ga. 277, 41 S. E. 6o2.
77 Ill. 475. See s DEVLIN DEEDS, Sees. 262, 280.
"Baker v. Baker, 159 Ill. 394, 397; Walter v. Way, xO Ill. oo; Shea v. Murphy,
164 Ill. 62x; Kelly v. Bapst, 272 Ill. 242; Hudson v. Hudson, 287 Il. 302; see also
Goodpaster v. Leathers, 123 Ind. 121; 23 N. E. Iogo; Stonehill v. I-astinis, 2o2 N. Y.
55, 94 N. E. so68; Williams v. Latham, 113 Mo. 165, 20 S. W. 99; Wheelwright v.
Wheelwright, a Mass. 447; Foster v. Mansfield, 3 Metc. 412.
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the grantor would have a fee subject to a conditional limitation
taking effect at his death. The disposition differs from an escrow
only in that the rights conferred are vested instead of contingent. It
is intended that the estate shall commence in futuro, but since the
right is vested, in practical effect the fee of the grantor is at once
cut down to a life estate.
It is true that in a genuine escrow the courts say that the deed
is not operative to pass the title until the happening of the future
event. Thus, in Grindle v. Grindle,21 where a conveyance from
father to son was placed in an envelope and deposited in a bank,
to be delivered on the death of both the grantor and his wife, in
connection with a separate contract for support, it was held that
the deed was not operative to convey title till the death of the
grantor and his wife and the performance of the contract. "Such
a deed has no effect as a conveyance and no estate passes until the
event happens and the second delivery is made, or at least the grantee
becomes absolutely entitled to such delivery." It would then relate
back to the time of the deposit.
It would seem, however, that in the common class of cases
where the grantor delivers the deed to take effect after the lapse
of time, upon the happening of some event sure to come, such
delivery is improperly termed an escrow.25 In Blaine v. Blaine,2 6
the Illinois Appellate Court says with reference to this situation:
"We think it clear that it must be held in the case *at bar that it was
the intention of the grantor to presently convey a title in fee to
the respective grantees, the enjoyment of which is to be postponed
until his death, or, in other words, that the effect of the deeds was
to reserve a life interest in the grantor, with the remainder in fee
to the grantees. There can be no question under the facts in this
case but that some title or interest was conveyed to the grantees
and that some title of interest remained in the grantor. * * * The
only estate that the grantor could retain would be that of life ten-
ant. * * * It was held in the case of Stone v. Duvall, supra, that
the grantor 'will be entitled to the use of the property as though
he had a life estate.' We can see no distinction between this and a
life estate itself."
It would be legally possible to hold both in cases where the
*' 240 MI1. 143.
2 Foster v. Mansfield, 3 Metc. 412 (1841); Ruggles v. Lawson. tN. Y., 9x5) 13
Johns 285, 7 Am. Dec. 375; Fitzgerald v. Allen, 240 Ill. 80, 94; Goincl v. McDaui.!s,
269 Il. 362.
^6.202 II. App.-453, at p. 462.
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deed provides on its face that it shall not be delivered or go into
effect until the death of the grantor, and also in cases where an
absolute deed is delivered to a third person with similar directions,
that such deed should operate as a conveyance of an estate to com-
mence in futuro, leaving a fee in the grantor, A, subject to a con-
ditional limitation or springing interest in fee to B, the grantee.27
According to this theory, while the use does not. arise until the
grantor's death, his land would be bound with it immediately, with-
out any particular estate precedent to support it. The fee would
continue in the grantor during his life. But since the limitations
are certain to take effect at the death of the grantor, it would seem
preferable to regard the interest remaining in him as reduced to an
estate for life without impeachment of waste.
A serious question arises if the grantor delivers a deed to a
third party with instructions that it is to become effective only upon
the happening of some uncertain future event or condition prece-
dent, as the survivorship of the grantee.2 8 In such a case the fee
in remainder could not vest on the delivery of the deed, and the
fee would have to remain in the grantor, possibly until his death,
and title might never pass to the grantee. Where the deed is to be
fully operative at the death of the grantor, this is regarded as a
certain event and the future estate of the grantee is a vested one.
But if an absolute deed is deposited with a third person to be deliv-
ered to the grantee upon some contingency or event which is uncer-
tain, as the non-recovery of the grantor from a particular illness or
a particular operation, or the survivorship of the grantee, or sup-
port of the grantor, it has been held that such a delivery is ineffec-
tual, even though the condition is fulfilled. 9 Is there any reason
for not carrying out the intent of the grantor in these cases? Any
policy to be safeguarded? Or is the doctrine based on a near-sighted
failure to discriminate?
It is established in almost all jurisdictions except Iowa that
there is no delivery where the grantor deposits a deed with a third
party, but reserves control over the deed, or rather over the opera-
^ Abbott v. Holway, 72 Me. 298; Jones v. Caird, 153 Wis. 384; Vinson v. Vinson,
4 I1. App. 138; Walker v. Marcellus, 226 N. Y. 347, 123 N. E_ 736; 30 HARv. L. REV.
508; 17 MicH. L. REV. 413.
2 Prutsman v. Baker, 30 Wis. 644.
'Stone v. Daily, (Cal., 'gig) x85 Pac. 665; Moore v. Trott, z56 Cal. 354, xo4 Pac.
578; Willams v. Daubner, 103 Wis. 521; Prutsrnan v. Baker, 30 Wis. 644; Hayes 
v.
Boylan, 141 Ill. 400; Ackman v. Potter, 239 Ill. 578; Russell v. Mitchell, 223 Ill. 438;
O'Brien v. O'Brien, 285 Ill. 570, 575; Weber. v. Brak, 289 Ill. 564, 124 N. E. 654 (1919).
See, Seeley v. Cnrts, x8o Ala. 445, 61 So. 807, Ann. Cas. 1915 C. 331. MAYFIFLD, J.,
condemns the rule as a snare or pitfall in which tO catch honest grantors and grantees.
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tion of the deed. No strings can be kept on such a deed.3" A testa-
mentary deed, that is, a deed which is ambulatory, to become an
operative instrument only after the death of the grantor, is invalid
for want of delivery. A would-be grantor cannot make a deed,
retain it among his papers or'under his control, and have it deliv-
ered as a conveyance after his death. He must put it into effect
during his life-time, or not at all.3 ' So long as the grantor retains
the right to recall or revoke a deed, though deposited with a third
party, the grantee can acquire no rights under it, and if the grantor
dies without parting with dominion and control over its operation, no
one can deliver it for him after his decease. 32
The courts fail to discriminate, however, between the question
whether the grantor gives up the right to recall the deed and whether
the transfer is to occur only on the happening of some uncertain
event. The idea that the grantor retains control in case of an un-
certain event or condition precedent is a purely gratuitous assump-
tion.33 In Weber v. Brak,34 an absolute deed from Thomas to
Brak, signed, sealed, and acknowledged by Thomas, and filed for
record, was found in a private box of the notary sealed in a plain
envelope, upon which was written the following: "This deed is to
be held and not delivered until after the death of Mrs. Thomas.
In the event Mrs. Brak dies before her mother, then this deed is to
be returned to Mrs. Thomas." It was held that where delivery to
a third person is made upon the express direction that it shall not
be delivered to the grantee unless he survives the grantor, the deed
is intended to operate as a will and there is no valid delivery. The
deposit of a deed to be delivered upon the grantor's death must be
unconditional and independent of any contingency such as survivor-
ship of the grantee.
Other cases where the courts confuse the question of whether
title is to pass at a future, uncertain time, with the question whether
the instrument is to become immediately operative by present deliv-
ery are the following: In Long v. Ryan35 an instrument was deliv-
3OMosier v. Osborn, 284 Ill. 141, 146; Linn v. Linn, 261 Il1. 6o6; Stevens v.
Stevens, 256 Ill. 140. Compare, contra, Lippold v. Lippold, X12 Ia. 134, 83 N. W. 8og.
31Cline v. Jones, iix Ill. 563.32Byars v. Spencer, 1o IIl. 429; Provart v. Harris, 1so IIl. 40; Stinson v. Ander-
son, 96 Ill. 373; Noble v. Tipton, 219 Il. 182; O'Brien v. O'Brien, 285 IIl. 575; Johnson
v. Fulk, 282 Ill. 328; Wilson v. Wilson, x58 II. 567; Linn v. Linn, 261 11. 6o6; z DEVLIU,
DEEDS (3d ed.] sec. 262.
"See O'Brien v. O'Brien, 285 IIl. 575; Benner v. Bailey, 234 Ill. 79; Latshaw v.
Latshaw, 266 IIl. 44; Taft v. Taft, 59 Mich. i85, 26 N. W. 426 (x886), 6o Am. Rep. 29X;
Foundling Hospital v. Crane [1911] 2 K. B. 367, 373.
:4289 Ill. 564.
33 166 Cal. 442, r37 Pac. 29. See also Stone v. Daily, (Cal., 19t9) x85 Pac. 665.
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ered to a third person to be handed to the grantee in the event of
the grantor's death before July 22, i910, but to be destroyed in event
of grantor's survival. This was held not a valid delivery.
'In Kenney v. Parks"8 it was held that a condition that the deed
(whether given by a wife to her husband direct or to a third party)
was not to be effective unless the husband survived the wife,
showed an absence of intent to deliver, as there was no present
vesting of title. In Bloor v. Bloor,37 a recent Washington case,
husband and wife executed simultaneous deeds to each other for
their property, and placed them in escrow to be delivered to the
survivor; it was held that there was no valid delivery, as each re-
served a right to recall his deed in case of surviving the other. The
deeds in these cases were to transfer title only on an uncertain event,
to-wit survivorship, and not on a certain event like death.3"
But in these cases there was no right reserved in the grantor
to alter or change the disposition of the property during his lifetime
except in the imagination of the court. In O'Brien v. O'Brien,3
it is said: "To constitute delivery it must clearly appear that it was
the grantor's intention to pass title at the time and that he should
lose control over the same."' 40  It is submitted that the passing of
title at the tinw of execution of the deed is not an element of deliv-
ery. The question is whether the instrument is made operative as
a consummated or completed legal act.4 A deed deposited with a
third party need not be upheld on the theory that title passes when
such deposit is made. An instrument conditionally delivered may
be immediately operative to create rights and liabilities, even though it
may be an escrow and confer contingent or executory interests,
which will vest only upon conditions precedent. A conditional
delivery differs from an absolute delivery merely in the fact that
the full operation of the deed is subject to a condition; the delivery
is in its nature as final and as irrevocable as absolute delivery. The
condition that the deed is not to take effect in the event of the
grantee dying before the grantor does not show that the grantor
did not part with dominion and control over the deed and also over
the title. It is an unfounded assumption to say that the grantor
125 Cal. 146, 57 Pac. 772. (S. c.) 137 Cal. 527, 70 Pac. 556.
31t (Wash., i919) 177 Pac. 722.
33 See Russell v. Mitchell, 223 Ili. 438, 79 N. E. 14.
'9 285 IIl. 575, 121 N. E. 243.
4
°So in Pemberton v. Kraper, 289 Ill. 295; Pollock v. McCarty, 189 Mich. 66; Felt
v. Felt, 155 Mich. 237, x8 N. W. 953; Willams v. Kidd, 170 Cal. 631, 151 Pac. 1, Ann.
Cas. 1916 E, 703. See also White v. Chellew, (Wash., i919) x85 Pac. 621.
4 1
Provart v. Harris, 150 Ill. 40; 17 MICH. L. REV. 103, 413; 16 Mi CH. L. Rzv. 58o,
586. 4 WIGseORE, EVIDENCE, § 2408.
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retains control over the instrument or its operation.4 2  Why does
he not lose his right to recall the deed provided the event happens?
He has manifested his intention by his acts or words to dispose of
his property and to make the deed a valid and effective instrument
of conveyance of the estate and interests described therein, sub-
ject to a condition precedent that is beyond his control or volition.
This constitutes delivery.43 Delivery is not a question of vesting
of title at once, but of making a deed binding or operative at once.
Whether the deed is delivered to take effect upon a certain or
upon an uncertairi event, it may equally be regarded as beyond the
control of the grantor to revoke or defeat its operation. If how-
ever, the event is sure to happen, for practical purposes it may be
said that the grantee has a vested estate, a fixed right of future
enjoyment, and that by a kind of subtraction the grantor's estate
is reduced to one for life only. Where the event is uncertain abso-
lute title does not pass to the grantee until the event occurs, but
nevertheless the deed may be put beyond the control of the grantor."
The arbitrary and unreasonable doctrine invalidating delivery to a
depository upon an uncertain condition constitutes a snare and pit-
fall to honest and innocent grantors and grantees. It has no foun-
dation in intelligent considerations of policy or convenience, but is
one of those irrational and technical distinctions that spring up in
the law, when the courts in "discovering" the law lose sight of its
practical ends, and formulate mechanical rules by deduction from
unfounded general assumptions. The sole effect of the rule is to
defeat the intention of the grantor in seeking to dispose of his prop-
erty by deed rather than by will. The fact remains that in most
states deeds may be delivered upon an uncertain condition only by
way of escrow and in general when supported by a collateral con-
tract. 5
Should it matter whether delivery is dependent not only upon
the certain event of the grantor's death but also upon the perform-
ance of a conditio after the grantor's death, such as giving him a
respectful and honorable burial? It would seem not. But in Taft
v. Taft," the Michigan court held that if A executes a deed to B,
his son, and gives it to X to deliver to B, if the latter shall after
" Nola; v. Otney, 75 Kans. 3xi, 89 rac. 690, 9 L. R. A. (N.S.) 317; Stanton v.
Miller, 58 N. Y. x92; Anderson v. Messenger, x58 Fed. 250; 4 WIGMORE, EvID NcE, Sees.
2405, 2408. See Hall v. Harris, 4o N. C. (s Ired. Eq.) 303.
"a See Jones v. Schmidt, 290 Ill. 97.
44Nolan v. Otney, 75 Kan. 311, 89 Pac. 69o; Hall v. Harris, 40 N. C. 303.
43 Campbell v. Thomas, 42 Wis. 437, 440, 449; Main v. Pratt, 276 Ill. 258, 114 N. E.
576. "Is a Contract Necessary to an Escrow?" R. W. AIGLER, 16 Micn. L. REv. 569.
46 59 Mich. s85, 26 N. W. 426, 6o Am. Rep. 291.
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A's death make provision for C, that the instrument was testa-
mentary and could not take effect as a deed.
The court said: "There is no reason of public policy which
would justify the enlargement of the range of cases where a title
can rest for any of its essentials upon parol evidence. * * *To
allow the performance of unwritten conditions to be purposely post-
poned until after death would be practically to remove the restraints
against parol and nuncupative wills."
This contention is not well founded. The deed must be made
operative by a valid delivery by the grantor during his life, but the
fact that there are conditions precedent to the transfer of title to
be fulfilled after the death of the grantor does not negative delivery
or render the instrument testamentary.4 7
It may be of interest to compare the situation resulting from
delivery of an absolute deed to a third person, to take effect upon
an extrinsic uncertain condition precedent, with the effect of an
instrument delivered by the grantor to the grantee, which contains
an express condition precedent on its face that the deed is to take
effect only if the grantee survives the grantor, or upon some other
uncertain event. There is very little authority upon the validity of
such provisions for springing interests, but there are intimations
in a few cases that they might affect the operation of the deed as a
conveyance and make it testamentary. 48
It would seem clear, however, that such a condition precedent
as that the grantee should survive the grantor, or that title should
pass to A upon his marriage to B, should not affect the validity of
the deed as a conveyance. It is simply a question of springing use.
It is sufficient that the deed creates an irrevocable possibility or
executory interest in the grantee, which renders the title of the
grantor subject to be drawn out of him at a future time, and gives
the grantee a right which will vest in the event designated accord-
ing to the terms of the deed.49  As the court says in Hudson v.
Hudson," "A grantor may convey an estate in his land beginning
at a future time, fixed by his death or at any arbitrary date before or
47 Nolan v. Otney, 75 Kans. 3x, 89 Pac. 69o, 9 L. R. A. (N.S.) 317; Jackson v.
Jackson, 67 Or. 44, 135 Pac. 2o, Ann. Cas. 1915 C, 373; Grindle v. Grindle, 240 Ill. 143.
" See Shackelton v. Sebree, 86 Ill. 617, 621; Bigley v. Souvey, 45 Mich. 370; Culy
v. Upham, 135 Mich. 13r, io6 Am. St. Rep. 388, 97 N. W. 405. Cf. Ekblaw v. Nelson,
(Minn.) 144 N. W. 1094. See note McGarrigle v. Roman Catholic Orphan Asylum, 145
Cal. 694, 79 Pac. 447, 1 L. R. A. (N.S.) 315, note.
4 0young v. Paine, 28& Ill. 649; Abbott v. Holway, 72 Me. 298; Murray v. Kerney,
"z5 Md. 514, 38 L. R. A. (N.S.) 937; Nolan v. Otney, 75 Kans. 31z, 89 Pac. 69o; Hunter
v. Hunter, 17 Barb. (N.Y.) 25; Vizson v. Vinson, 4 I1. App. 138; Re Diez, 5o N. Y. 88.
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after his death, or it may be fixed by any circumstances the grantor
may choose." Where the estate is on condition precedent, the grantee
has the mere possibility of an estate until the performance of the
condition."
The Illinois court no longer holds that a grantor cannot by
deed mount a fee upon a fee, or create an estate to vest upon an
uncertain event in derogation of a preceding estate. It now holds
that there may be shifting interests created by deed by which the
grantor conveys the fee, subject to executory and contingent lim-
itations. 2 It should equally recognize the creation of contingent
springing limitations.
In Tennant v. Tenrnant's Memorial Home,5 3 it is held that "the
reservation of a power to revoke a deed does not render it testa-
mentary. The instrument is testamentary only when it shows an
intent of the maker that it shall not be operative as a disposition
until the maker's death. It operates as a present conveyance if it
passes a present interest in a future estate, although subject to
being defeated on the occurrence or non-occurrence of a future
event. There is no difference between the power to revoke con-
tained in a deed of trust and in an ordinary conveyance."
What difference, it may be asked, is there between a deed con-
ditioned to take effect at death in which a power of revocation is
expressly reserved, the deed being delivered direct to the grantee,
and a deed absolute in form delivered to a depositary or escrow
holder to deliver to the grantee on the death of the grantor, pro-
vided the grantor does not revoke the instructions and recall the
deed before his death? What reason or policy of the law demands
that the one deed should be declared operative and the other not?
It is commonly said that there is no delivery so long as the grantor
reserves control over the deed or its operation.5 4 But that is what
the grantor may do by express provision. In either case he has
manifested his intention that it should be effective as his deed,
unless he revokes, and there seems no conclusive reason why the
law should not aid his intention. The Iowa court is, however,
almost the only one that so holds. An analogy might perhaps be
found in the tentative savings bank trust cases, revocable at will
until the depositor's death. In case the depositor dies without
revocation, an absolute trust is created as to the balance on hand.55
a TIPFANY ON REAL PROPERTY, Sec. 6s; x JoNEs REAL PROPERTY, Sees. 61g, 621.
12 Cutler v. Garber, 289 Ill. 200, 205; 14 ILL. L. REv. 151, 225.
S67 Cal. 570, 140 Pac. 242.
14 Stone v. Daily, (Cal., 1919) i85 Pac. 665. Cf. Lippold v. Lippold, supra.
5'Re Totten (1904), 179 N. Y. xx2.
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In the "Merchant of Venice," Shylock is reported to have
made a testamentary deed to Lorenzo and Jessica as follows:
"From the rich Jew a special deed of gift,
After his death, of all he dies possessed of."
In a common law jurisdiction Shylock's deed would fail. A
deed which attempts to convey all of the property, real and per-
sonal, which the grantor shall own and possess at his death, would
be held invalid. This is put on the ground that no present estate
or interest in property then owned by him could have passed, and
therefore the instrument, considered as a conveyance, is simply
void, as a deed takes effect upon its delivery, if at all. A will, on
the other hand, speaks from the death of the testator and operates
on property then on hand. 6
In Ricker v. Brown,5 7 a deed by a man to his housekeeper of
"all the residue of my property, real or personal, not otherwise
assigned to her, which may be remaining in my name and owner-
ship at my death," was held good as a covenant to stand seised of
real estate belonging to him at the time of execution of the deed,
subject to a power to dispose of the property during his life. The
deed was not testamentary, as it took effect at the time of its exe-
cution.5" The test to determine whether an instrument is a will or
deed is not clear or easy to apply. A will is essentially a tentative
nomination of successors, to take effect at death. 59 If the devisee
dies before the testator the devise lapses, as he has nothing to trans-
mit. A will is ambulatory up to the testator's death, so that by its exe-
cution he has parted with no rights and divested himself of no inci-
dent of his estate.6G  A deed, on the other hand, must convey some
right, present of future, vested, contingent or executory in some
specific property then owned by the grantor to some existing
grantee.61  The grantee even in a deed deposited in escrow has an
inheritable right. A deed is essentially a present conveyance of
some interest, present or future. It is sometimes said that it must
5 Roth v. Michalis, 125 Ill. 325; Mould v. Rohn, 257 Ill. 436. Cf. Linn v. Campbell.
289 Ill. 347, 352. See also Niccolls v. Niccolls, (1914) 168 Cal. 444, 143 Pae. 712; 3
CAL. L. REv. 256; Walker v. Yarbrongh, (Ala.) 76 So. 390; Martin v. Graham, (Miss,
ig97) 75 So. 447; 16 MTcIn. L. REv. 59.
5- 183 Mass. 424, 67 N. E. 353.5 1Cf. Tuttle v. Raish, ix6 Ia. 33r, go N. W. 66. "In event of my death. I do make
and constitute my wife sole owner of all our property."-Ield a will.5 Hudspeth v. Grumke (Mo., 1919), 214 S. W. 865, 867; O'Day v. Meadows, 594 Mo.
6x8, 92 S. WV. 637, 645, X12 Am. St. Rep. 542; Sharp v. Hall, 86 Ala. iso, 5 So. 497,
ir Am. St. Rep. 28.
6ONichols v. Emecry, xo9 Cal. 323, 41 Pac. IO89, 5o Am. St. Rep. 43; Kelly v. Parker,
iSi Ill. 49, 54 N. E. 615; Massey v. Huntington, 118 IIl. 8o, 89, 7 N. E. 269.
6 1DuBois v. Judy, 29! Il1. 340, 349.
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pass a present interest, but one should say rather presently pass an
interest on its execution. The creation of a future or executory
intercst is to be contrasted with the future creation of an interest.
A deed is not rendered testamentary because of reservations re-
specting the use of the property during the grantor's life, or by
provisions that "title" shall pass at the grantor's death, or even
by a power of revocation; but it must divest the grantor to some
extent of his title, at least to the extent of creating a liability to
have it drawn out of him without further act on his part. If an
instrument is intended to become binding presently and nothing is
left for the grantor to do to complete the transaction, then it need
not be regarded as of a testamentary character. It is sufficient if
it appears that the maker intended to convey any estate or interest
whatever, though it be future or contingent.
62
It is a more convenient and economical method to dispose of
property by deed than by will. It would be the sounder policy for
the law, in case of doubt, not to be over-ready to condemn an
instrument as testamentary, but to uphold it as a deed of convey-
ance, and thus make it effectual in the simplest manner, especially
if it be so executed as not to be good as a will.
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